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Annulments for Lack of Love and Affection
Samuel Abrahams*
N EW YORK LONG HAS ENJOYED the dubious distinction of
being the most flexible jurisdiction for the granting of an-
nulments of marriages. As a student of the subject relates,
"For those unable or unwilling to travel and assume residence
outside the state, New York offers an unusually expansive con-
cept of annulment to mitigate the severity of the divorce law." I
There is some anticipation that the recently revised divorce
statute will tend to make annulments less appealing and at-
tractive to those who are incapable of resorting to foreign forums
for the severance of the marital tie. 2 Annulments for fraud are
allowed to be instituted by sections 7 and 140 (e) of the New
York Domestic Relations Law.3 Do the subjective elements of
love and affection play any meaningful role in ascertaining the
grounds for fraudulent conduct in the arena of annulments?
Over five decades of litigation in New York and elsewhere
indicate that dishonest professions of love and affection per se
prior to marriage are not considered vital in annulling the bonds
of matrimony. The cases fully reveal that disingenuous ex-
pressions of romantic warmth and devotion are usually linked
with ulterior motives to gain specific objectives otherwise im-
possible of attainment. Professor Milton Gershenson of the
Brooklyn Law School rightfully maintains that "when standing
alone, such misrepresentation does not warrant an annulment.
Where coupled with other facts, such as a scheme to evade the
immigration laws, or a scheme to mulct the spouse, or a scheme
to get a free medical education, it becomes fraud justifying an-
nulment." 4
Only two reported cases in New York and Missouri have
seemingly rejected the principle that love and affection may
not be interposed by themselves as the legal foundation for the
*B.A., MA., LL.B., LL.M.; Member of the Brooklyn, New York City, Bar.
1 Franck, The Annulment of Marriage in New York, 1 U. Brit. Col. L. Rev.
471, 472 (1961).
2 N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 254 (rev. 1966). For an authoritative analysis of
the new law, see Foster and Freed, The Divorce Reform Law, 5-37 (1966).
3 N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 140(e) reads in part as follows: "An action to
annul a marriage on the ground that the consent of one of the parties
thereto was obtained by fraud may be maintained by the party whose
consent was so obtained within the limitations of time for enforcing a civil
remedy of the civil practice law and rules .... But a marriage shall not be
annulled ... on the ground of fraud, if it appears that, at any time before
the commencement thereof, the parties voluntarily cohabited as husband
and wife, with a full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud."
4 Gershenson, Fraud in the New York Law of Annulment, 9 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 51, 66 (1939).
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dissolution of a conjugal relationship. The Appellate Division
of the Fourth Department awarded a decree of annulment in
the Schinker case to a spouse whose husband had maintained
a powerful erotic connection with a young lady in California
(site of his military post) while espousing the noble thoughts
of undying fealty and irrevocable passion during the court-
ship. While the plaintiff had knowledge of the out-of-state ro-
mance during the engagement period, the opinion holds she was
induced to enter into the marriage by the supposedly deceptive
tactics of the defendant who forswore any further involvement
with his paramour. The court reasoned that she would not
have consented to the marriage proposal if her mental faculties
had not been diminished by his ostensibly truthful intentions
toward her. This decision is evidently an indirect circumven-
tion of the inveterate legal doctrine that false pleas of love and
affection cannot serve as a basis for annulling an otherwise legally
constituted marriage.
As early as 1913, the Appellate Division of the Second De-
partment in Schaeffer v. Schaeffer6 formulated the rule that
hardship, injustice and unfortunate consequences cannot impel a
court to annul a marriage because an aggrieved party had been
victimized by the sham and deceitful outpourings of a specious
suitor. The opinion held that, while a serious miscarriage of
justice had been perpetrated on an innocent girl by a scheming
scoundrel, no conventional legal principle could be employed
by the court to destroy this misalliance by an annulment. As
Justice Carr appropriately suggested,
. . . we have not yet arrived at a legal stage which
requires an annulment of a marriage because one party or
both parties were untruthful to each other in their mutual
protestations of all-consuming and undying love.7
The identical position has been adopted by courts outside
of New York as shown by the following statement of a New
Jersey court in the well-known case of Salzberg v. Salzberg, "A
marriage cannot be annulled for the reason only that no love
existed between the parties to the marriage at the time there-
of." 8 In Feig v. Feig,9 the Appellate Division of the First De-
5 Schinker v. Schinker, 271 App. Div. 688, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 470 (1947); Rankin
v. Rankin, 17 S. W. 2d 381 (Mo. 1929).
6 160 App. Div. 48, 144 N. Y. S. 774 (1913); see also Longtin v. Longtin,
22 N. Y. S. 2d 827 (1940); Jennings v. Jennings, 186 Misc. 1021, 63 N. Y. S.
2d 294 (1946); and Bloom v. Bloom, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 890 (1947). This opinion
is favorably quoted in the Montana case of Baird v. Baird, 232 P. 2d 348
(Mont. 1951).
7 Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 160 App. Div. 48, 49; 144 N. Y. S. 774 (1913).
8 107 N. J. Eq. 13, 153 A. 605 (1931).
9 232 App. Div. 172 (1931); see also Nickols v. Nickols, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 651
(1955).
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partment declined to annul a marriage because of the sup-
posedly spurious demonstrations of passion and love of a young
bride who had recently arrived in the United States after marry-
ing the plaintiff in her native habitat of Rumania. Justice
Merrell could not find any warrant for annulling a legitimate
marriage due to the post-nuptial change of heart and altered
mental state of the defendant; it seemed obvious that the hapless
wife did not harbor any antecedent misgivings about the plain-
tiff. She had become unusually distraught in a novel environ-
ment far removed from the pace and quality of her placid
nativity. The court also relied on former section 1143 of the
CPA (now section 144 of the Domestic Relations Law) which
disallows the testimony of interested parties in this kind of an
annulment case without other satisfactory evidence.
The very learned and intellectually oriented treatise of
Justice Hammer in the New York County Supreme Court case
of Rubman v. Rubman0 in 1931 annulled a marriage where the
defendant had obtained the plaintiff's consent to marriage by
his ardent professions of love for her while concealing his funda-
mental motivation which was to evade the quota provisions of
the immigration laws by marriage to the plaintiff. The jurist
decreed that the committed fraud rendered nugatory the fact
of consent which is indispensable for the validity of a contract,
matrimonial or otherwise. The court in the Rubman dispute
chose to pierce the veil of disingenuousness and misrepresenta-
tion about love and affection and founded its decision upon the
basic concealed intent. At the same time, the cases clearly
underscore the admonition that an injured party is not permitted
to cohabit with the dissimulator after discovering the fraudulent
maneuvering to obtain entry into the United States. 1
But a sincere and non-exclusive desire to seek American
citizenship in the context of the marital vow will not condemn
a marriage and sanction the rendering of a decree of annul-
ment, according to decisions of the New York County Supreme
Court and the Superior Court (Appellate Division) of New Jer-
sey. 12 Justice Geller in New York maintained that the de-
fendant-spouse possessed the physical capacity to enter into the
marriage and had subsequently fulfilled all the expected nuptial
obligations of a true and devoted wife. The opinion asserted that
it is taken for granted in these times of continuing world crises
10 251 N. Y. S. 474 (1931); see also Miodownik v. Miodownik, 259 App. Div.
851 (1940); Pastore v. Pastore, 199 Misc. 435, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 552 (1950);
and Lederkramer v. Lederkramer, 173 Misc. 587, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 725 (1940),
for the most brazen instance of deception.
11 See Bracksmayer v. Bracksmayer, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 110 (1940); see also
Cantor v. Cantor, 234 N. Y. S. 2d 600 (1962).
12 Novick v. Novick, 17 Misc. 2d 350, 185 N. Y. S. 2d 388 (1959); and Cirulli
v. Licata, 10 N. J. Super. 449, 77 A. 2d 288 (1950). A somewhat related issue
is to be found in Kurys v. Kurys, 25 Conn. Supp. 495, 209 A. 2d 526 (1965).
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that the desirability of American citizenship by an alien may be
one of the inducing factors leading to the marriage altar. As the
jurist opined,
The proof adduced shows no more than defendant's natural
desire to attain American citizenship and falls far short of
establishing that she married plaintiff solely for that pur-
pose and with no intention of consummating the marriage. 13
The facts evidenced a good faith marriage on the part of the de-
fendant who had been a British subject in Canada with the
knowledge of the plaintiff prior to the marital ceremony. United
States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, sitting in the
Superior Court (Appellate Division) of New Jersey in 1950,
wrote along parallel lines that
The act of an alien in entering into a bona fide marriage
with the express purpose "to avoid deportation" is not il-
legal. . . . The law distinguishes between such a marriage
and a marriage entered into not in good faith but as a
mere sham, or pretense, formed for the purpose of "evading"
a judgment of deportation. 14
Courts of sister states have uniformly subscribed to the legal
postulate that a marriage entered into with the intent of evading
the immigration laws is voidable at the option of the deceived
party since this type of behavior flouts the basic character of
lawful contractual dealings.15
The perennial problem of male malefactors seeking false
marriages for economic advancement and support has plagued
our courts for over three decades. Courts have generally ruled
that reprehensible, outrageous and vicious conspiracies to utilize
the facade of love and affection for pecuniary enrichment war-
rants the decreeing of annulments. But each controversy must
be assessed on its intrinsic facts and patterns of concealment
and prevarication. The Oneida County Supreme Court in Berar-
dino v. BerardinoI6 dismissed a request for an annulment due to
the husband's mendacities and falsehoods about his monetary
status before the marriage. The opinion did not question the
depth of his love for his spouse and felt he had been truthful in
his declarations in the romantic sphere. To bolster its argument,
the court quoted from the ancient New York case of Keyes v.
Keyes" to the effect that
Fabrications and exaggerations of this kind, while not com-
13 Novick v. Novick, 185 N. Y. S. 2d 388, 389 (1959).
14 Cirulli v. Licata, 77 A. 2d 288, 290 (N. J. Super. 1950).
15 Babis v. Babis, 45 Del. 496, 75 A. 2d 580 (1950).
16 280 N. Y. S. 13 (1935).
17 6 Misc. 355, 26 N. Y. S. 910 (1893).
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mendable, are so common as to be tolerated by the law on
grounds of public policy.'8
But an Albany County Supreme Court case19 would appear to
contradict the rationale and foundation of the Berardino formula.
The opinion termed the mendacious warranties of a good home
and furnishings gross fraud in inducing marriage. The defend-
ant had also included representations of love in his promises
prior to the execution of the marital rites. As Justice Taylor
stated,
Fraud in inducing one to marry in reliance upon an express
promise to furnish and establish a home and to provide
support which a defendant had no intention of keeping
gives rise to a cause of action for annulment.2
0
The most famous cause celebre in this field is the case of
Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzofl-Daschkoff2l decided by the
Court of Appeals in 1952. The decision tends to adopt the basic
reasoning of the Albany County Supreme Court in denying an
annulment for premarital untruths and distortions about love
and money. While the court repudiated the discredited idea
that fraud must have a direct impact on the essence of the
marriage such as consortium and cohabitation before a decree of
annulment may be granted, it asserted that marriage for the sole
purpose of extorting resources from a wealthy female did not
fall within the category of matter vital to the marriage. As Jus-
tice Desmond said,
Premarital falsehoods as to love and affection are not enough,
nor disclosure that one partner "married for money." 22
It is not easy to accept the logic of the Court of Appeals in the
Woronzoff-Daschkoff case, but the obvious economic station of
the victim probably dissuaded the jurists from invoking the
long-established rule that a husband is fully liable for the sup-
port of his spouse. She surely did not rely on his professed desire
to find employment after the marriage. But his conniving to
mulct her certainly partakes of the basic ingredients of fraud.
In a recent case, 23 Justice Widlitz in the Nassau County
Supreme Court followed the dictates of the Court of Appeals in
the Woronzoff-Daschkoff battle by rejecting a plea for an annul-
18 Berardino v. Berardino, 280 N. Y. S. 13, 15 (1935).
19 Siek v. Siek, 196 Misc. 165, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 470 (1949); aft'd, 276 App. Div.
1035, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 234 (1950).
20 93 N. Y. S. 2d 470, 473 (1949).
21 303 N. Y. 506, 104 N. E. 2d 877 (1952); favorably referred to in Patey v.
Peaslee, 111 A. 2d 194 (N. H. 1955).
22 303 N. Y. 506, 512; 104 N. E. 2d 877, 880 (1952).
23 Avery v. Avery, 18 App. Div. 705, 236 N. Y. S. 2d 379 (1962).
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ment predicated on false economic promises of postnuptial sup-
port and provisions for a private residence. The decision also
operated on the presupposition that an ordinarily prudent per-
son could not be deceived by such representations; the fraudu-
lent statement, according to the opinion, must be so powerfully
overriding as to tame the reasoning capabilities of a person of
average intelligence and comprehension.
The matter of Ryan v. Ryan 24 in the New York County
Supreme Court stands for the theory that malingering mem-
bers of the titled nobility class in Europe may not contract to
marry American citizens for the primary aim of securing an
economic return sufficient to enable them to live in leisurely idle-
ness. The court described this type of fraud as essentially a
mockery of the sacred institution of marriage and the family. Ac-
cording to the decision, marriage may not be equated with pur-
chase and sale of bargains.
Medical students may not seek the benefit of a marital ar-
rangement without some reciprocity in the nature of husbandly
dedication and affection, according to the leading case of Feyn-
man v. Feynman.25 While granting the annulment for fraud to
the naive and trapped wife, Justice Wenzel elaborated on the
point that the absence of love and respect did not figure in his
legal reasoning. He detected the brazen elements of fraud in
the circumstance of the defendant's lack of prenuptial intent to
cohabit with his spouse after reaching his goal of medical edu-
cation through her largesse.
The courts have pretty well delineated the boundaries of
fraud in the area of love and affection. The fundamental premise
of the judicial approach is best epitomized in Justice Coyne's
opinion in a Westchester County Supreme Court case:
Promises of undying love and affection, of dutiful and faith-
ful connubial demeanor, and of comfortable and happy home
surroundings are insufficient, notwithstanding plaintiff's
claim that he relied upon such promises and would not have
entered into the marriage had the same not been made. The
law assumes that those entering upon the marriage con-
tract will accord each to the other all of the rights and privi-
leges incident upon the relationship.26
Lawyers in New York and several other jurisdictions should
be alerted to the fact that, in this and other sectors of the an-
nulment-for-fraud picture, it is not necessary to plead the three-
year Statute of Limitations, according to very recent decisions in
the Albany County Supreme Court and the Appellate Division
24 281 N. Y. S. 709 (1935).
25 4 N. Y. S. 2d 787 (1938).
26 Washburn v. Washburn, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 569, 570 (1936).
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of the Fourth Department.27 In all other civil litigation, the
Statute of Limitations is deemed waived if it is not specifically
raised as an affirmative defense in the pleadings.
The American viewpoint on such personal and subjective
matters as love and affection finds backing in the writing of
David H. Vernon who is the author of an outstanding model
code for annulments. In his words, "Marriage is too serious a
business to permit annulment on the basis of testimony con-
cerning a party's subjective feelings." 28
27 See Shoddy v. Shoddy, 269 N. Y. S. 2d 584 (1966); and Romano v. Ro-
mano, 156 N. Y. L. J. 39 (1966). For origin of the three year statute of
limitation, see Von Lingenthal, A Medieval Procedural Form for Marriage
Annulment Cases, 10 Am. J. Legal Hist. 76, 81 (Jan. 1966).
28 Annulment of Marriage: A Proposed Model Act, 12 J. Pub. L. 163 (1963).
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